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ABSTRACT
In recent years, vulnerable hosts and maliciously registered
domains have been frequently involved in mobile attacks. In
this paper, we explore the feasibility of detecting malicious
domains visited on a cellular network based solely on lexical
characteristics of the domain names. In addition to using
traditional quantitative features of domain names, we also use
a word segmentation algorithm to segment the domain names
into individual words to greatly expand the size of the feature
set. Experiments on a sample of real-world data from a large
cellular network show that using word segmentation improves
our ability to detect malicious domains relative to approaches
without segmentation, as measured by misclassification rates
and areas under the ROC curve. Furthermore, the results are
interpretable, allowing one to discover (with little supervision
or tuning required) which words are used most often to attract
users to malicious domains. Such a lightweight approach
could be performed in near-real time when a device attempts
to visit a domain. This approach can complement (rather
than substitute) other more expensive and time-consuming
approaches to similar problems that use richer feature sets.
Keywords-Mobile Network Security, Domain Name Analysis,
Text Mining, Logistic Regression, Word Segmentation, Lasso
Regularization
I. INTRODUCTION
The frequency of mobile attacks has increased dramatically
in recent years with the ubiquitousness of smartphones [1],
[2]. Numerous mobile attacks have utilized poorly managed
hosting sites or newly registered domains to serve as phishing
sites, command-and-control (aka C&C) servers or to host
malware binaries [3]–[5]. It is of great interest to users and
network service providers to be able to detect which domains
are malicious as quickly as possible and to proactively protect
users from visiting them.
Previous approaches to detecting malicious domains and
URLs have used machine learning algorithms trained on
historical data to measure the extent to which various fea-
tures of these domains or URLs are correlated with their
“maliciousness”, which is often measured by a reputation
score or membership in a manually verified blacklist. There
is a general tradeoff between speed and accuracy in these
approaches: Greater accuracy is often only possible by using
computationally intensive feature generation methods, such as
retrieving web content or using metadata from DNS lookups
and WHOIS queries. Our approach differs from these in
that we only use lexical features of domain names in our
algorithms, providing a fast, lightweight solution.
Note that by only considering domain names in our de-
tection algorithm, rather than full URLs, the set of potential
lexical features is of limited size. Unlike full URLs, which
can be split into tokens, for example, by delimiters such as
slashes and periods, domain names, by definition, can only
contain alphanumeric characters and hyphens. To overcome
this challenge, we use a word segmentation algorithm to
segment domain names into individual tokens, generating large
numbers of new features with which to train our classification
models. We show that using token-based features in our
models provides substantial increases in predictive accuracy
relative to models that only use traditional quantitative lex-
ical features of domain names, such as length, the number
of digits, and Markov model-based features, among others.
Furthermore, we can also interpret our fitted models to learn
which words attract users to malicious sites, and which words
are typically associated with benign domains. Our experiments
are performed on domain names that were visited on a cellular
network, although our methodology is generalizable to domain
names visited on a wired network.
II. RELATED WORK
Several researchers have studied the detection of malicious
domains and URLs using machine learning in recent years.
In a relatively early paper, Gerara et al. [6] used logistic
regression on 18 features with approximately 2500 training
examples to model membership on a blacklist of URLs.
They included features in which tokens were obtained using
an algorithm to extract long, common substrings of URLs,
which identified 150 words across the roughly 1200 positive
examples, and they subsequently manually trimmed this word
list to the eight words that they considered the most likely
to have predictive power. McGrath and Gupta [7] studied
characteristics of phishing URLs and domains, discovering
that various features such as domain name length, frequencies
of certain characters, and the presence of certain brand names
in URLs were associated with phishing, but they limited
themselves to a descriptive study, rather than developing a
predictive model. He et al. [8] used several Markov models
trained on different text corpora to create features which cap-
tured the fact that legitimate domains often contain meaningful
English words while many malicious domain names do not.
They also extracted lexical features in new domain names
as well as features in DNS data, and used various machine
learning methods to classify new domain names. Bilge et al.
[9] used a set of 15 DNS-related features to predict domain
name maliciousness, two of which were lexical characteristics
of the domain names: the percentage of characters that were
numerical, and the proportion of the domain name that was
comprised by the longest English-language word; they did not,
however, use individual words as features. Yadav et al. study
algorithmically generated malicious domain names [10] by
looking at the distributions of unigrams and bigrams in domain
names that are mapped to the same set of IP addresses. They
compare the performance of several distance metrics, includ-
ing KL-distance, edit distance and Jaccard measurement to
identify new domains that are suspiciously similar (measured
via distance) to known bad domains. Last, Ma et al. [11] used
machine learning methods to detect malicious URLs in a paper
that is the most relevant to our work. They used both lexical
and host-based features of URLs in several supervised learning
algorithms to differentiate benign and malicious URLs. They
include words as features, but they limit their vocabulary
of words to those that are separated by a specific set of
punctuation marks in the domain name or URL path. None
of these machine learning approaches to malicious domain
detection have used word segmentation on the domain names
to generate thousands of additional features as we do.
Word segmentation, defined here as transforming a single
string into a sequence of one or more non-empty substrings,
has been applied to domain names in previous work. Wang
et al. [12] perform a series of experiments performing word
segmentation on URLs. They manually annotate each URL
in their experiment with a correct segmentation (including
multiple plausible options if applicable) and they measure
which training corpus (from a small set of candidates) max-
imizes their algorithm’s performance recovering the known,
true segmentations in their labeled data. Srinivasan et al. [13]
extend this approach by incorporating the lengths of segments
into their algorithm, and they evaluate their performance on
domain names that have been manually segmented by human
annotators. In contrast to these approaches, rather than evaluat-
ing word segmentation by its ability to recover a known correct
segmentation, we focus on how well word segmentation works
in the context of predicting malicious domains.
III. DATA
Our domain name data consists of what are known as
effective second-level domain names. Given a full URL,
we first identify the top-level domain (TLD) according
to the public suffix list [14]. Then, the effective second-
level domain name is defined as the combination of the
TLD and the string of characters between the TLD and
the second period to the left of the TLD. For exam-
ple, in the URL http://www.more.example.com/
path-to-url.html, the TLD is com and the effective
second-level domain name is example.com. For the rest
of the paper, a “domain” or a “domain name” refers to the
effective second-level domain name.
The domains that we used in our experiments came from
two sources. First, we gathered a sample of “fresh” domains
that were visited on the cellular network of a large U.S.
cellular provider during the month of September 2014. A
“fresh” domain for a given day was defined as any domain that
was visited that day, but that had not been visited during the
preceding 30 days (on the cellular network). In other words,
these domains consist of a mixture of brand-new domains
(that, perhaps, came into existence during or shortly before
September 2014) and relatively unpopular domains (that may
have been in existence for a long time prior to September
2014, but had not been visited recently). From 26 days in
September (omitting 4 due to data feed interruptions), we
gathered a sample of 1,372,120 fresh domains (> 52, 000 per
day), all of which were, by definition, unique. Second, we
gathered a random sample of 30,000 domains from DMOZ,
the open directory project [15] on November 20, 2014 (out of
2,472,408 unique fully qualified domain names listed there at
the time).
The outcome variable that we trained our models to predict
is based on the Web of Trust (WoT) reputation rating [16]
(which was also used by [10]). The WoT reputation rating
is an integer in {0, 1, ..., 100} that describes how trustworthy
a domain is, according to a combination of user-generated
reviews as well as a domain’s membership on various public
blacklists and other third-party systems. WoT also provides a
confidence score for each rating, which is also an integer in
{0, 1, ..., 100} denoting how reliable the reputation rating is for
a given domain, where higher confidence scores indicate more
reliable ratings. Furthermore, WoT reputation ratings come in
two categories: “Trustworthiness” and “Child Safety”. We only
consider the “Trustworthiness” rating in our experiments.
The WoT API documentation [17] explains that a WoT
reputation score, denoted r, falls into one of five labeled
categories:
1) 0 ≤ r < 20: Very Poor
2) 20 ≤ r < 40: Poor
3) 40 ≤ r < 60: Unsatisfactory
4) 60 ≤ r < 80: Good
5) 80 ≤ r ≤ 100: Excellent
The WoT API documentation also suggests a threshold on the
confidence score c such that a rating is reliable only if c ≥ 10,
but further suggests that different thresholds may be optimal
for different applications.
In our experiments, we defined the binary variable “mali-
ciousness”, denoted mi, based on the WoT rating for domain
i, denoted ri, where the domain is “malicious” (mi = 1) if
ri < 60, and the domain is “safe” (mi = 0) otherwise.
We queried the WoT API for reputation ratings (and con-
fidence scores) for all 1,372,120 domains in our sample of
cellular network domains, and we successfully gathered a
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF WOT DATA FOR CELLULAR NETWORK DOMAINS
Statistic Reputation Ratings Confidence Scores
Mean 61.1 7.2
Median 62 6
St. Dev. 18.0 6.3
# < 60 38,377 -
# ≥ 60 223,246 -
# < 10 - 180,191
# ≥ 10 - 81,432
reputation rating and confidence score for the “Trustwor-
thiness” category for 261,623 of them. These queries were
performed approximately 40-60 days after the dates on which
the domains were visited in the cellular network (such that
for new domains, there was sufficient time for users to flag
the domain as malicious, but not so much time that a high
proportion of malicious domains would revert to being benign
before we queried their ratings). Following previous work
[11], we assumed that all the DMOZ domains were benign
(mi = 0), since they are curated by editors. A few summary
statistics of these WoT reputation ratings and confidence scores
are listed in Table I.
We ran three experiments to measure how accurately we
could predict the maliciousness of domain names based on
different feature sets. The three experiments are differentiated
by which subsets of data formed the training and test sets:
1) The “balanced” data set consisted of 30,000 randomly
sampled malicious domains visited on the cellular net-
work (out of 38,377), and the 30,000 randomly sampled
safe domains from DMOZ. 15,000 from each group
were randomly sampled to form the training set, and
the other 15,000 of each group were designated as the
test set. The baseline rate of maliciousness in this data
set is (30,000)/(60,000) = 50%.
2) The “unfiltered cellular” data set consisted of all 261,623
domains visited on the cellular network, with 80%
randomly sampled as the training set, and the remaining
held out as the test set. The baseline rate of malicious-
ness in this data set is (38,377)/(261,623) = 14.7%.
3) The “filtered cellular” data set consisted of a subset of
80,077 domains visited on the cellular network (out of
261,223) that had a confidence score c ≥ 10 and a
reputation rating r ∈ {0, 1, ..., 39} ∪ {60, 61, ..., 100},
omitting low-confidence ratings and ratings in the mid-
dle of the scale (which might indicate that the mali-
ciousness of the domain is ambiguous). The baseline rate
of maliciousness in this data set is (19,639)/(80,077) =
24.5%.
IV. FEATURES
The features that we generated to predict maliciousness fall
into five groups: (1) Basic features, (2) Character indicator
variables, (3) Log-likelihood, (4) Top-level domains, and (5)
Words. Each set of features was measured for each of the
261,623 (cellular) + 30,000 (DMOZ) = 291,623 domains in
our data.
A. Basic Features
We measured four “basic” features:
1) number of characters: the number of characters in the
domain name, excluding the top-level domain and all
periods. (mean = 11.5).
2) number of hyphens: the number of hyphens in the
domain name (mean = 0.12).
3) number of digits: the number of digits in the domain
name (mean = 0.09).
4) number of numbers: the number of numbers in the
domain name, where a number is defined as a string of
consecutive digits of length > 0 (mean = 0.04).
To allow for non-linear relationships between these features
and the outcome, we binned the number of characters into
deciles, and the other three basic features into the bins {0, 1,
2, ≥ 3}. The hypothetical football-related domain “4downs-
10yards.com”, for example, contains 14 characters, 3 digits,
one hyphen, and two numbers. Rather than 4 feature vectors,
the binned versions of these four basic features contain 10, 4,
4, and 4 feature vectors, respectively.
B. Character Indicator Variables
We created 36 binary features to measure the presence of
each character from “a” to “z” and each digit from 0 to 9 in
each domain name. The most and least frequently occurring
characters were “e” and “q”, respectively (occurring at least
once in 198,304 and 5,152 domain names, respectively), and
the most and least frequently occurring digits were “1” and
“7”, respectively (occurring at least once in 3,980 and 1,193
domain names, respectively).
C. Log-likelihood
We computed the log-likelihood of the sequence of charac-
ters in each domain name using a first-order Markov model as
the probability model for characters in the English language.
To define the transition probabilities between characters, we
computed the table of first-order transitions from a list of the
top 1/3 million unigrams from the Google Ngrams corpus
[18]. For each domain, we removed digits and hyphens, and
then computed the log-likelihood of the sequence of remaining
characters, using the distribution of first characters in the
unigram list as the probability distribution of first characters
for each domain. We also computed a normalized version
of this feature in which we divided the log-likelihood by
the number of characters in the domain (omitting digits and
hyphens) to account for the fact that longer domains on
average have lower log-likelihoods. Last, we binned these
values into deciles (as we did with the “number of characters”
feature), and we included an additional, 11th bin for the
197 domain names in the data that only contained digits and
hyphens (and thus had a missing value for the log-likelihood).
D. Top-level domains
We observed 857 unique top-level domains (TLDs) in our
data, where each domain belongs to exactly one TLD (defined
as existing on the Mozilla Public Suffix List [14]). The most
common TLD is “.com” (58% of domains in our sample), and
the next 5 most common are “.org”, “.net”, “.de”, and “.co.uk”
(11%, 5%, 3%, and 3% of domains, respectively). 337 of the
857 TLDs were only observed once.
E. Words
Another source of features in domain names are individual
words. First, we define some notation. In a set of domain
names, we refer to a token as a single occurrence of a word
within a domain name, where each unique token type in the
data defines a word. The vocabulary is the list of all words
observed across the collection of domain names. If the domain
“duckduckgo.com”, for example, were segmented into three
tokens, {“duck”, “duck”, “go”}, it would only contain two
words: “duck” and “go”.
Since all domain names in our data are unique, it would be
impossible to statistically learn anything about maliciousness
by treating the entire domain names themselves as tokens.
Domain names often, however, contain occurrences of words
concatenated together, which are often human-readable, at-
tracting users to websites. We attempt to extract individual
word occurrences (i.e. tokens) from our set of domain names,
allowing us to learn the associations between individual words
and maliciousness in our training data, which, in turn, allows
us to predict maliciousness of new domains that contain
individual words in common with those in our training set.
To do this, we use a word segmentation algorithm (here
“word” is used in the informal sense) described by Norvig
[19]. Using a sample from the the Google bigrams corpus
to define a probability model for pairs of consecutive words
(including a default low probability for pairs involving a word
that does not exist in the bigram list), Norvig describes a
dynamic programming algorithm to compute the most likely
segmentation of a string of characters into a set of one or
more tokens. We applied this algorithm to the 291,623 domain
names in our data by ignoring periods and the TLDs, and
then applying the segmentation algorithm to each hyphen-
separated substring of each domain name. In essence, we treat
the hyphens as known token boundaries, and then we segment
the resulting substrings using Norvig’s algorithm to extract
additional tokens that are not hyphen-separated. The result is
a list of 682,253 tokens observed across the 291,623 domain
names, for an average of 2.34 tokens per domain (with a range
of 1 to 11 and a mode of 2). This average is quite close
to the 2.24 and 2.21 average tokens per domain reported in
two experiments in [13], although less than the 2.66 average
tokens per URL from [12], which is reasonable since domain
names are substrings of URLs. The 30 most common words
and their frequencies are listed in Table II. Although many
of the most frequent words, such as “a”, “of”, and “the”,
would be discarded as “stop words” in other text mining
applications, we included them in our feature set because our
modeling method performs regularization such that features
with no signal will be ignored (i.e. their coefficients will be
set to zero) “automatically”. Overall there were 94,050 words
in the vocabulary. Rather than using word frequencies within
Word Freq Word Freq Word Freq
1 a 6772 11 on 1638 21 shop 1168
2 the 6186 12 my 1593 22 world 1157
3 i 3515 13 is 1426 23 music 1143
4 of 3183 14 club 1393 24 city 1078
5 s 2789 15 web 1380 25 it 1056
6 in 2630 16 art 1297 26 center 1047
7 online 2554 17 inc 1234 27 news 1034
8 and 2495 18 co 1187 28 st 1032
9 e 1847 19 for 1181 29 free 1017
10 to 1772 20 de 1171 30 group 1012
TABLE II
TERM FREQUENCIES
domains as features, we simply recorded the 0/1 presence of
a word in a domain in our feature construction so that the
scale of these features matched those of the other feature sets
(and because it didn’t make a large difference: only 0.3% of
domain names contained more than one occurrence of a given
word).
V. MODELS AND METHODS
For each of our three experiments and each of our seven
combinations of feature sets (described in the following para-
graph), we fit a logistic regression model using the lasso
penalty [20] to regularize the parameter estimates. The lasso
places a penalty on the L1 norm of the regression coeffi-
cients, and has the effect of setting many coefficients to zero,
which aids interpretability as well as improves out-of-sample
predictions by avoiding overfitting. Ma et al [11] found that
lasso-regularized logistic regression models performed as well
in a similar task to other methods such as Naive Bayes and
support vector machines. In our experiments we chose the
lasso penalty parameter by using 10-fold cross-validation on
the training data, and choosing the largest value of the penalty
parameter that gave a cross-validated AUC within one standard
error of the minimum [20] (this is known as the “one standard
error rule”). We used the R package glmnet [21].
We fit seven models (named M1 - M7) to our training data
in each of the three experiments. Each of the seven models
is defined by its use of a different combination of the five
sets of features. The first five models each use one individual
set of features (to allow a comparison of the usefulness of
each feature set in isolation). M6 uses all feature sets except
words. Finally, M7 uses all five feature sets. The difference in
predictive accuracy between models M6 and M7 is of greatest
interest to us, as this comparison quantifies the predictive
benefit of using word segmentation on the domain names in
addition to the other four feature sets. The same seven models
were fit to the data in each of the three experiments.
To measure the effectiveness of our approach, we computed
the misclassification rate (MCR) and the area under the ROC
curve (AUC) on the test set for each model in each experi-
ment. Our primary outcome variable is the AUC, because it
summarizes the tradeoff between the true positive rate and
the false positive rate of a classifier, where larger values
generally indicate that more favorable tradeoffs are available.
We do not, however, suggest any specific threshold on the
predicted probability of maliciousness above which to assign
a label of “malicious” to a domain name. The choice of this
threshold depends on the relative costs of false positives and
false negatives in the particular problem to which this approach
is being applied (see [22] for a discussion of this tradeoff). Our
MCR results are based on a naive threshold of 0.5.
VI. RESULTS
Table III contains a summary of the fits of the seven models
for the “balanced” data set. For the balanced data, the TLD
Feature Sets MCR AUC # Features # 6= 0
M1 Basics 0.435 0.595 22 6
M2 Characters 0.478 0.536 36 29
M3 TLD 0.288 0.763 489 101
M4 Log-likelihood 0.492 0.512 22 13
M5 Words 0.373 0.667 24772 4588
M6 M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 0.297 0.771 569 104
M7 M6 + Words 0.277 0.813 25341 2928
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF MODEL FITS TO BALANCED DATA
feature set resulted in the best predictions on the test set among
the models that used an individual feature set (M1 - M5), based
on the MCR and the AUC. M7, which includes all five feature
sets, is the best model, as measured by MCR and AUC, and
decreases the MCR of M6 (the same as M7 except excluding
words as features), by about 2% (on an absolute scale) and
increases the AUC by about 4% (on an absolute scale). M7
has slightly fewer than 3000 active (nonzero) features.
Table IV contains a summary of the fits of the seven models
for the “unfiltered cellular” data set. The results on this data
set are similar to those on the balanced data set, except for
two notable differences:
1) The baseline rate of maliciousness is much lower (14.7%
compared to 50%), and the improvement in MCR as the
models grow more complex is smaller (on the absolute
scale and the relative scale) than in the case of balanced
data.
2) The best model among M1 - M5 is the model using the
Words feature set, rather than the TLD feature set, as
was the case in the balanced data set experiment.
As before, M7 provides the best performance across the
models, and in this case is substantially better with respect
to AUC than M6.
Features MCR AUC # Features # 6= 0
M1 Basics 0.146 0.563 22 13
M2 Characters 0.145 0.576 36 27
M3 TLD 0.140 0.657 479 99
M4 Log-likelihood 0.146 0.542 22 18
M5 Words 0.137 0.708 77866 12568
M6 M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 0.137 0.696 559 158
M7 M6 + Words 0.125 0.779 78425 9938
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF MODEL FITS TO UNFILTERED CELLULAR DATA
Table V contains a summary of the fits of the seven models
for the “filtered cellular” data set. The results on this data set
are similar to those on the “unfiltered cellular” data set, except
that the MCR rates decrease at a faster rate, and the AUC is
higher.
Features MCR AUC # Features # 6= 0
M1 Basics 0.240 0.593 22 11
M2 Characters 0.242 0.597 36 23
M3 TLD 0.211 0.681 323 33
M4 Log-likelihood 0.250 0.557 22 9
M5 Words 0.212 0.720 38025 8578
M6 M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 0.199 0.744 403 119
M7 M6 + Words 0.167 0.817 38428 5416
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF MODEL FITS TO FILTERED CELLULAR DATA
VII. DISCUSSION
We designed the first experiment to be similar to that of
[11], in which the authors constructed, among other data
sets, a balanced data set with 15,000 benign URLs sampled
from DMOZ. Our lowest error rate of approximately 28%
is much higher than their lowest error rate of about 1.5%.
They, however, use many more features than we do, including
lexical information from the path of the URL and various
pieces of information gathered from DNS lookups and WHOIS
queries. We also use different sources of malicious domains
and a different outcome variable, making a direct comparison
impossible. The relative improvement in predictive accuracy
that we observed by using word segmentation (M7) compared
to omitting word segments as features (M6) – 6.7% and
5.4% for MCR and AUC, respectively – suggests to us that
our approach could complement their more expensive, but
potentially more accurate method.
In the second and third experiments, we found that the
MCR decreased by 1.2% and 3.2% on the absolute scale,
and by 8.8% and 16.1% percent on the relative scale, re-
spectively, when using M7 instead of M6. Furthermore, the
AUC increased by 8.3% and 7.3% on the absolute scale
and 11.9% and 9.8% on the relative scale for experiments
2 and 3, respectively, when using M7 instead of M6. These
types of gains, demonstrated on a sample of real-world data,
would represent substantial improvements if they were to be
implemented at scale. Figure 1 shows ROC curves for the
seven models fit to the filtered cellular data set (Experiment
3).
We note that although the model with the most sets of fea-
tures, M7, performed the best in each of the three experiments,
it wasn’t the case that this model contained the most nonzero,
or active, features. To the contrary, M7 contained fewer active
features than M5 in each of the three experiments, because in
the presence of the features from the first four sets, not as many
individual words were found to be useful (i.e. were active)
in predicting maliciousness. This demonstrates the efficacy of
lasso-penalized logistic regression for variable selection.
In addition to improving the accuracy of predictions of
malicious domains, these logistic regression models provide
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Fig. 1. ROC curves for the filtered cellular data set
interpretable coefficients that describe associations between
the features and domain maliciousness. We will interpret the
fit of M7 to the “filtered cellular” data set (experiment #3)
in detail. Of the 22 basic features, 11 were nonzero. Among
them, a domain length of 8-9 characters was predictive of
maliciousness, replicating a result found by McGrath and
Gupta [7], and additionally domains in the top decile of length
(> 18 characters) were predictive of maliciousness. Large
numbers of hyphens (3 or more) and digits (2 or more) were
both found to be positively associated with maliciousness as
well; the result pertaining to digits is also consistent with
McGrath and Gupta [7]. Among character features, the five
characters most strongly associated with malicious domains
were all rare: “x”, “z”, “q”, “y”, and “j”. For both the
raw and the normalized log-likelihood features, we found
that low log-likelihoods (the bottom two deciles, specifically)
were predictive of maliciousness, and for unnormalized log-
likelihoods, membership in the top decile was associated with
benign domains. This suggests that some malicious domains in
our data set may have been registered using an unsophisticated
algorithm that did not attempt to mimic English language
words, but simply combined long strings of numbers and
digits. The TLDs that were most strongly associated with
malicious domains were “.co”, “.us”, and “.eu”, whereas the
safest TLDs were “.de” and “.gov”.
Of the 5416 nonzero features in M7 (on the “filtered
cellular” data set), 5327 of them were words. Among the
largest 400 out of these 5327 coefficients (i.e. those most
strongly associated with maliciousness) were several words
that fell into groups of related words, which we manually
labeled in the following list:
1) Brand names: rayban, oakley, nike, vuitton, hollister,
timberland, tiffany, ugg
2) Shopping: dresses, outlet, sale, dress, offer, jackets,
watches, deals
3) Finance: loan, fee, cash, payday, cheap
4) Sportswear: jerseys, kicks, cleats, shoes, sneaker
5) Basketball Player Names (associated with shoes):
kobe, jordan, jordans, lebron
6) Medical/Pharmacy: medic, pills, meds, pill, pharmacy
7) Adult: webcams, cams, lover, sex, porno
8) URL spoof: com
Several of these groups of words are well-known to be popular
in phishing campaigns, such as the brand names [7], shopping-
related words, adult-themed words, and words associated with
online pharmacies. URL-spoofing words such as “com” (and
others such as “www”, “login”, “mail”, and “search”, which
were among the top 600 most malicious words) were also
found to be associated with maliciousness in prior studies [6],
[11]. It was especially interesting to be able to discover that
certain basketball players’ names are associated with malicious
domains – theoretically, these names would change over time
as new basketball players became popular, and a model like
M7, trained on a sliding window of fresh data, would detect
the new names.
There were also several interesting words associated with
benign domains, which we also found easy to manually group
together:
1) Locations: european, texas, india, europe, vermont,
zealand, washington, colorado
2) Hospitality Industry: inn, ranch, motel, country
3) Common Benign Numbers: 2000, 411, 911, 2020, 365,
123, 360
4) Realty: realty, builders, homes, properties, estate
5) Small Businesses: rentals, outfitters, lumber, audio,
funeral, flower, taxidermy, inc, golf, law, farm, chamber,
farms, rider, photo
6) Geographical Features: creek, hills, lake, ridge, river,
valley, springs, grove, mountain, sky, island
Although digits were generally associated with maliciousness,
there were certain common numbers, such as 411, 365, and
123 that appear to be used by legitimate, benign domains on a
regular basis. Also, the set of words that describe geographical
features (creek, hills, etc.) are associated with benign domains,
and in our examination, they often appear in benign websites
for municipalities, golf courses, realty groups, and rental
properties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the growing popularity of social media and blogs,
as well as the ubiquitousness of smartphones, it is of great
interest for users and cellular network providers to be able
to proactively identify malicious domains. We find that word
segmentation applied to domain names adds substantial pre-
dictive power to a logistic regression model that classifies
domain names based on their lexical features. In our experi-
ments on real-word data, models that used word segmentation
decreased relative misclassification rates and increased relative
AUC rates by roughly 10% compared to similar models that
didn’t use word segmentation. Our method also provides
interpretable results that show which words attract users to
malicious sites. These words would naturally change over time
as attackers change their methods, but a model such as the one
presented here could be fit to a sliding window of recent data
to continuously monitor and detect new words that are being
used in malicious domains.
Our results, of course, depend on the data we used: “fresh”
domains visited on a cellular network and WoT reputation
ratings as the outcome. Using different thresholds for the out-
come variable, different time lags for the query that gathered
the WoT reputation ratings, or a different outcome variable
altogether (such as one that is specifically tailored to mobile
traffic) are interesting directions for future work. We also
plan to investigate further into the relative performance of
our models on brand-new domains vs. relatively low-traffic
domains, since our data set of domains that had not been
visited in the prior 30 days consists of a mixture of these
two types of domains.
The output of our lightweight method could potentially be
used to apply near-real time detection of suspicious domains
when a device attempts to visit a domain in a cellular network.
If a domain is estimated to have a high probability of being
malicious based solely on its name, then a more expensive
analysis (such as web content-based analysis) could be used
to determine further action, such as blocking the site or
inserting a “speed bump”. In this way, the word segmentation
techniques described here could improve existing systems
that use machine learning to detect malicious domains by
generating thousands of additional features with which to
classify domains.
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